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JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(h).

1

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
During their eighteen year marriage, the parties had five children who, at the time
of trial, were 16, 14, 10, seven and four. During the marriage Appellee, Ms. Resendes,
primarily stayed at home to raise the children and keep house, although she occasionally
worked as a nurse on a part-time basis. The trial court imputed to Ms. Resendes an
income of $16.60 an hour for 72 hours a month. Did the trial court abuse its discretion
when it declined to impute a full-time income to Ms. Resendes and to calculate support
obligations based upon the greater imputation of income?
Standard of Review
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the
marriage. If these factors have been considered, the trial court's alimony award will not
be disturbed unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 Ut App. 236, If 26, 9 P.3d 171, 179 (Utah Ct. App.
2000).
An abuse-of-discretion standard is used in determining whether a trial court has
erred in refusing to impute greater income to a party. See, e.g., Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963
P.2d 757, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
impute additional income based on the facts before it).
Questions of statutory construction are reviewed for correctness. See Wells v.
2

Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (1994).
FACTS
This appeal concerns a divorce and related award of support. The parties were
married for 18 years and have five daughters who at the time of the divorce ranged in
ages from four to sixteen. Trial tr. 177:21. The wife ("Ms. Resendes") had been the
primary caretaker of the children, staying home during the marriage except to work part
time on rare occasions. Id. at 72:15-16; 75:3-7. The husband ("Mr. Resendes") is an
executive director in the public health field. Id. 70:1. Ms. Resendes is a registered nurse
and a massage therapist. Id. 73:9-17; 75:20 - 76:10. In determining support awards, the
court imputed income to Ms. Resendes based on 72 hours per month at $16.60 per hour.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
L The trial court properly followed the law when it imposed support obligations on Mr.
Resendes
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the
marriage. If these factors have been considered, the trial court's alimony award will not
be disturbed unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.
Mr. Resendes asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed
support obligations on him. However, the record reveals that the trial court considered
3

the factors required when making its alimony award.
7/. It was within the courts discretion to impute apart-time income to Ms. Resendes
Numerous Utah cases have in fact upheld the imputation of part-time income to a
party in a divorce. In Fletcher v. Fletcher the Utah Supreme Court sustained an alimony
award to the custodial wife based on her part-time income "so she might give adequate
care and nurturing to the three younger children, ranging in age from four to eight." In
addition to noting the wife's role as care-giver to the children, the Court noted that the
husband had sufficient income to provide support. Just as in Fletcher, the court below
awarded support based on Ms. Resendes working part time so that she could continue in
her role as care- giver to the children. Furthermore, as in Fletcher, the court properly
determined that Mr. Resendes had sufficient income to provide support.
In Rehn v. Rehn, the court upheld the imputation of a lesser income than the wife's
historical earnings since the wife was the primary caretaker of the parties' minor children
and because "it is sufficient to impute a lesser income to the recipient spouse so that she
might give adequate care and nurturing to the parties' minor children." In holding that
there was no error in imputing lesser earnings to the wife, the court noted that the trial
court considered "the historical roles both parties played in the marriage - that is, Mrs.
Rehn was the primary caretaker of the parties' minor children." As in Rehn, Ms.
Resendes's historical role throughout the marriage had been as the stay-at-home parent
and primary caretaker of the children. Furthermore, the court designated Ms. Resendes
as the primary residential parent.
4

As in the cases discussed above, the court here, in making the requisite
considerations in determining support, heard evidence that Ms. Resendes's historical role
in the marriage had been as primary care-giver to the children, and found that she would
continue to serve that role after the divorce. The court imputed part-time income to Ms.
Resendes specifically so that she could better serve as the primary care-giver. The court
further found that Mr. Resendes had sufficient income to provide support.
III. Mr. Resendes misconstrues the statute in asserting that the law requires imputation
of full-time income
Mr. Resendes erroneously suggests that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c)
requiring imputation of income "at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour
workweek" in cases in which a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is
unknown requires imputation of full-time income even when there is recent work history
or where a parent's occupation is known. Mr. Resendes makes another erroneous
interpretation of statute when he asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(d),
prohibiting imputation under certain circumstances, requires imputation in the absence of
those circumstances.
IV. The cases on which Mr. Resendes relies are distinguishable from or do not apply to
the facts of this case
For support of his contention that Utah law requires the imputation of full time income,
Mr. Resendes sites Mancil v. Smith, which states, "Utah's clear policy is to require both parents
to support their child to the extent that each isfinanciallyable." But Mancil addressed whether
5

the near future, the court abuses its discretion when it declines to impute full-time income to Ms.
Resendes at that time. Mr. Resendes's concern is that if the court does not make a provision
imputing full-time income at the time the youngest child enters school, the opportunity will be
lost. But the fact is, at the time the youngest child enters school, Ms. Resendes will still be the
primary caretaker offiveschool-age children. Numerous Utah courts have sustained imputation
of part-time income under similar circumstances.
ARGUMENT
I. The trial court properly followed the law when it imposed support obligations on Mr.
Resendes
In determining whether to award alimony and in setting the amount, a trial court
must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient
spouse; the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support; and, the length of the
marriage. If these factors have been considered, the trial court's alimony award will not
be disturbed unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 Ut App. 236, H 26, 9 P.3d 171, 179 (Utah Ct. App.
2000).
Mr. Resendes asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed
support obligations on him. However, the record reveals - and Mr. Resendes does not
dispute - that the trial court considered the factors required when making its alimony
award. The court below itemized the needs of the recipient spouse, Ms. Resendes.
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 12, f 30. The court analyzed the
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earning capacity of Ms. Resendes. Id. at p. 11, ^ 27. The court analyzed the ability of
Mr. Resendes to provide support. Id. at pp. 11-12, ^flf 27-29. Finally, the court
considered the length of the marriage. Id. at pp. 13-14, f32. Under Utah law, when these
factors have been considered, the trial court's alimony award will not be disturbed unless
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Kelley v.
Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 at 179. Mr. Resendes does not assert that the court failed to make
these requisite considerations in determining support payments.
II. It was within the courts discretion to impute a part-time income to Ms. Resendes
In considering the earning capacity of Ms. Resendes, the court imputed to her a
nurse's wages of $16.60 per hour at 72 hours per month. Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. p. 11, % 27. It is in this imputation of income that Mr. Resendes
asserts the trial court abused its discretion. Appellant's Brief, pp. 4-5.
As will be discussed below, Mr. Resendes asserts that, as a matter of law,
imputing part-time income to Ms. Resendes constituted abuse of discretion. Before
reaching Mr. Resendes's arguments it should be noted that numerous Utah cases have in
fact upheld the imputation of part-time income to a party in a divorce. (See e.g., Reinhart
v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)).
In Fletcher v. Fletcher the Utah Supreme Court sustained an alimony award to the
custodial wife based on her part-time income "so she might give adequate care and
nurturing to the three younger children, ranging in age from four to eight." Fletcher, 615
P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah 1980). In addition to noting the wife's role as care-giver to the
8

children, the Court noted that the husband had sufficient income to provide support. Id.
Just as in Fletcher, the court below awarded support based on Ms. Resendes working
part time so that she could continue in her role as care- giver to the children. Amended
Facts and Law, p. 11, f 27. Furthermore, as in Fletcher, the court properly determined
that Mr. Resendes had sufficient income to provide support. Id. at pp. 11-14,fflf27-33.
In Rehn v. Rehn, the court upheld the imputation of a lesser income than the wife's
historical earnings since the wife was the primary caretaker of the parties' minor children
and because "it is sufficient to impute a lesser income to the recipient spouse so that she
might give adequate care and nurturing to the parties' minor children." Rehn, 1999 UT
App 041, f 9, 974 P.2d 306, (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In holding that there was no error in
imputing lesser earnings to the wife, the court noted that the trial court considered c<the
historical roles both parties played in the marriage - that is, Mrs. Rehn was the primary
caretaker of the parties' minor children." Id. As in Rehn, Ms. Resendes's historical role
throughout the marriage had been as the stay-at-home parent and primary caretaker of the
children. Trial Tr. p. 133,1. 19. Furthermore, the court designated Ms. Resendes as the
primary residential parent. Amended Fact and Law, p. 2. ^f 5.
As in the cases discussed above, the court here, in making the requisite
considerations in determining support, heard evidence that Ms. Resendes's historical role
in the marriage had been as primary care-giver to the children, Trial Tr. p. 133,1. 19, and
found that she would continue to serve that role after the divorce. Amended Fact and
Law, p. 2. \ 5. The court imputed part-time income to Ms. Resendes specifically so that
9

she could better serve as the primary care-giver. Amended Fact and Law, p. 11,127.
The court further found that Mr. Resendes had sufficient income to provide support. Id.
at pp. 11-14,fflf27-33. The lower court's actions were thereby in line with those of
Utah's appeals courts and do not constitute an abuse of discretion.
III. Mr. Resendes misconstrues the statute in asserting the law requires imputation
of full-time income
Child support obligations are fixed in proportion to the adjusted gross incomes of
the parents. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.7(1). Gross income is generally established by
proof of current income. Id. § 78-45-7.5(5)(b). However, the court may impute gross
income if it has first examined a parent's historical and current earnings to determine that
underemployment or overemployment exists. Id. § 78-45-7.5(5)(c), (6). Here, the court
imputed to Ms. Resendes an income of $16.60 per hour at 72 hours per month.
A.

The statute does not require imputation of full-time income

Mr. Resendes acknowledges that the court imputed income based upon work
history, occupation qualifications and prevailing earnings as required under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(5)(b).

Appellant's Brief, p. 7. However, Mr. Resendes goes on to

argue that, as a matter of law, imputed income must be based on at least a 40-hour work
week. Id. In support of this assertion, Mr. Resendes sites Utah Code Ann. § 78-457.5(7)(c) which states that "If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is
unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour
workweek." Id.
10

Mr. Resendes has misinterpreted the statute. § 78-45-7.5(7)(c) applies when no
recent work history is available or when a parent's occupation is unknown. As Mr.
Resendes acknowledges, Ms. Resendes occupation and her work history were in fact
known and considered by the court. There was therefore no occasion to resort to § 7845-7.5(7)(c). Mr. Resendes asserts that the "40-hour workweek" language of § 78-457.5(7)(c) applies equally to § 78-45-7.5(7)(b)'s requirements regarding imputation of
income when there exists recent work history or when the parent's occupation is known.
Appellant's Brief, p. 7. But this interpretation violates basic rules of construction. § 7845-7.5(7)(c) supplies a minimum income to be imputed when there is otherwise no
information to derive an income. It provides an alternative when the requirements of §
78-45-7.5(7)(b) do not apply. When (7)(b) applies, there is no resort to any part of (7)(c).
What's more, the income imputed to Ms. Resendes exceeds the income from the
federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. The court imputed to Ms. Resendes an
income of $16.60 per hour for 72 hours of work per month. This equals $1,195.20 per
month. The federal minimum wage of $5.15 for a 40-hour work week equals $824.00 per
month.
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(d), prohibiting imputation of income under certain
circumstances, does not require imputation in the absence of those circumstances
Mr. Resendes makes another erroneous interpretation of statute when he asserts
that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(d), prohibiting imputation under certain
circumstances, requires imputation in the absence of those circumstances. Utah Code
11

Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7)(d) states, "Income may not be imputed if any of the following
conditions exist..." Under the statute, imputation is prohibited when child care would eat
up the earnings of the custodial parent, when a parent is prevented by handicap from
earning minimum wage, when a parent is engaged in occupational training, or when a
child has needs requiring the parent's presence in the home. It is clear error of
construction to assume as Mr. Resendes does that this language requires imputation of
income, (full-time income, according to Mr. Resendes) in the absence of any of the
conditions listed. A prohibition of some action in the presence of certain conditions is
not the same as a requirement of the same action in the absence of those conditions. If
the legislature had intended otherwise it would have said so.
IV. The cases on which Mr. Resendes rely are distinguishable from or do not apply
to the facts of this case
For support of his contention that Utah law requires the imputation of full time income,
Mr. Resendes sites Mancil v. Smith 2000 UT App 378, f 16, 18 P.3d 509, 512 (Utah Ct. App.
2000) ("Utah's clear policy is to require both parents to support their child to the extent that each
isfinanciallyable."). But Mancil addressed whether the court was prohibited from imputing
income to a parent in an undergraduate degree program based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-457.5(7)(d)(iii), (prohibiting imputation when "a parent is engaged in career or occupational training
to establish basic job skills").
In Mancil the noncustodial father argued that no income ought to be imputed to him, and
that he ought not be required to pay any child support on the grounds that he was attending

12

college. In rejecting the father's attempt to avoid making child support payments the court said
that "[t]o allow a parent to disregard this duty over the course of a four-year college education
would run counter to this policy," requiring both parents to support their child to the extent that
each isfinanciallyable. 2000 UT App 378 at f 16, 18 P.3d 509 at 512.
A more relevant precedent is found in Reinhart v. Reinhart, in which the wife stipulated at
trial to a monthly income. 963 P.2 757, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The husband argued the trial
court should have imputed additional income based on the wife's earning capacity as a nurse. Id.
The trial court questioned whether the wife, a full-time student in a graduate nursing program,
could hold down the shift work required for the higher salary while caring for her four minor
children. Id. Thus the court imputed only the monthly income to which she had stipulated. Id.
The appeals court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impute
additional income. Id.
Mr. Resendes looks for support in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), which rejected a wife's challenge to a trial court's imputation of income to her.
Appellant's Brief, p.8. But it is not in dispute that the court has discretion to impute income. The
fact that a court may impute greater income to a party than that party would prefer does not
diminish the fact that the court may likewise impute less income to a party than the other party
would prefer. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, unlike the instant case, in Cummings the wife
to whom the court was imputing income was not the custodial parent. 821 P.2d 472 at 474.
Rather, the father had been granted custody of the children. Had the wife been the custodial
parent, as is the case here, the court might have imputed a lesser income like the courts in
Fletcher v. Fletcher, Reinhart v. Reinhart, andRehn v. rehn, and doing so would have been
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within its discretion.
V. That all the minor children are in school does not require the court to impute full-time
income to Ms. Resendes
Trial courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards. Therefore, a trial court's
alimony award will not be disturbed so long as the trial court exercised its discretion within the
appropriate legal standards, and supported its decision with adequate findings and conclusions.
Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Mr. Resendes does not assert that the
court below failed to support its decision with adequate findings and conclusions. Rather, Mr.
Resendes asserts that the trial court failed to properly interpret the statute when it declined to
impute to Ms. Resendes a full-time income. As has been shown, Mr. Resendes's assertion, and
his interpretation of the law, is erroneous.
Mr. Resendes asserts in the alternative that because the youngest of the children will be
attending school in the near future, the court abuses its discretion when it declines to impute fulltime income to Ms. Resendes at that time. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. Mr. Resendes's concern is
that if the court does not make a provision imputing full-time income at the time the youngest
child enters school, the opportunity will be lost.
But the fact is, at the time the youngest child enters school, Ms. Resendes will still be the
primary caretaker of five school-age children. Amended Decree, f 3. It is within the court's
discretion to impute a part-time income to Ms. Resendes that she might give adequate care and
nurturing to the parties' five minor children. See Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d at 310-11 (sufficient to
impute a lesser income to recipient spouse to give adequate care to two school-age children aged
six and nine); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d at 1223 (income limited to part-time employment so
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recipient wife might give adequate care and nurturing to three children, ranging in age from four
to eight); Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d at 758 (lower income imputed to recipient wife to care
for her four minor children).
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imputed part-time income to Ms.
Resendes. The trial court properly followed the law when it imposed support obligations on Mr.
Resendes, considering the needs of the recipient spouse, the earning capacity of the
recipient spous, the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support, and the length of the
marriage. It was within the court's discretion to impute a part-time income to Ms.
Resendes and numerous Utah cases have in fact upheld the imputation of part-time
income to a party under similar facts as those in this case. Mr. Resendes misconstrues the
statute when he asserts that the law requires imputation of full-time income. The cases on
which Mr. Resendes relies are distinguishable from or do not apply to the facts of this
case. Finally, the trial court is not required to impute full-time income to a parent once the
youngest child enters elementary school. It has been found reasonable to impute less
income to custodial parents with school-aged children.

15

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's appeal should be denied on all counts and the trial
courts well-reasoned findings and order should be upheld. Appellee Tamara Joy Resendes asks
for an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this (3

day of /ii

iu^*>2005

I hereby that on this 15th day of March, 2006,1 mailed, postage prepaid, two accurate
copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to:

Lorie D. Fowlke
Scribner & McCandless, P.C.
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 220
Provo, Utah 84604
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Addendum 1

LORIE D. FOWLKE. 6875
PAUL WALDRON 7660
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C.
2696 No. University Ave., Ste. 220
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT RESENDES,
Petitioner,
vs.

:
:

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

TAMARA JOY RESENDES,
Respondent.

:
:

Case No.
Judge:

024600138
Paul Lyman( < t L , McS^f2

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 2" day of April, 2004, the Honorable
Judge Paul D. Lyman presiding. The Respondent appeared in person and was represented by her
attorney, Douglas L. Neeley. The Petitioner appeared in person and was represented by his
attorney, Lorie D. Fowlke. The Court, having received and accepted the parlies' partial
stipulation, having received the sworn testimony of witnesses and other evidence, having heard
argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters
the following:

j

1.

Both Petitioner and Respondent are bona fide residents of Sevier County, State of

Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on July 2, 1986, in the City of Salt Lake,

County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, and are presently married.
3.

During the course of the marriage, the parties have experienced irreconcilable

differences that have prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage relationship.
4.

There have been five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Melissa

Joy, born January 13, 1988; Elysha Briana, born May 4, 1990; Lauren Taylor, born September

o

13, 1994; Aubriana Tess, born April 1, 1997; and Annaliese Corrine, born July 14, 1999.
5.

The court adopts and incorporates the orders regarding custody and visitation

from the Order Pursuant to Stipulation (Hearing Date: September 15, 2003) wherein the parties
^

are awarded the joint legal custody of the partie's minor children. The Respondent shall be

;

designated as the primary residential parent for the children in regards to parenting time.
6.

The Petitioner is entitled to parenting time pursuant to the statutory guidelines, which

includes every other weekend, mid-week visits and alternating holidays.
a.

Special Days. The parties' stipulated and the Court orders up to eight (8) potential

additional "special visitation" or "special event" days. These additional days shall be at the direction
.of the Special Master.
b.

Lunch Dates with Dad. Petitioner is awarded alternating lunch with one (1) of the

children at school, so long as it does not interfere with the school curriculum. If Petitioner plans to

remove lhat child from the school during the lunch hour for a special lunch, he should notify the
Respondent prior to doing so.
c.

Telephone Contact with Children. The non-custodial parent shall be entitled to

reasonable telephone contact with the minor children. During the school year and Respondent's onehalf summer blocks, Petitioner shall be entitled to call the children a couple times per week (2-3).
However, all phone calls shall be prior to 9:00 p.m. and should be of a reasonable duration.
Likewise, Respondent shall be entitled to this same telephone contact with the minor children during
those times that the children are with Petitioner for his one-half summer blocks. The children shall
be entitled to call either parent at any time as they desire and neither party shall prohibit or limit the
children from doing so. In addition, if Petitioner so desires, he may purchase a cell phone for the
exclusive use of the children so that they may contact him whenever or wherever they may be.
d.

Events of Children. Each party shall be ordered to notify the other parent in

advance of any and all events in the lives of their children so that both parents may participate
and support the children in said events.
e.

Notice to Move. If either party intends to move from Sevier Couinty, that parent

shall provide to the other parent sixty (60) days advance written notice.
f.

Communication. All communication between the parties shall be via e-mail.

However, this rule shall not apply to urgent or emergency situations. During these types of
situations, telephone contact is appropriate and accepted.
g.

Religious Ordinances. Petitioner has the first right to perform all LDS religious
3

ordinances for the minor children, so long as he is deemed worthy by his ecclesiastical leaders to
do so.
h.

Encourage Visitation. The court instructs the parties to be aware that parenting

time with the visiting parent is not the children's choice, nor should the children be given the
choice as to whether or not they can or should be allowed to exercise parenting time. The
Respondent is required to encourage the children and simply deliver the children for purposes of
parenting time with the Petitioner. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent are admonished that
the children should be ready to be delivered, as well as returned at the designated times, pursuant
to statute. Both parties shall respect and accommodate the needs of their daughter, Melissa, as it
relates to her extra-curricular activities and schedule. However, Melissa's schedule does not
minimize her need to have regular and scheduled parenting time with her father. Reasonable and
minor alternations to parenting time can be made with the assistance of the Special master
7.

Petitioner and Respondent are each awarded one-half of each and every summer

with the minor children in the following manner.
a.

The parties are entitled to two (2) week blocks with the minor children

which will alternate between them for the duration of the summer. Summer parenting time will
be subject to normal and statutory parenting time by the non-custodial parent (i.e weekend
visitation). However, one (1) week prior to the commencement of school, the children will be
returned to the Respondent in order to prepare for school.
b.

Each party is entitled to one (1) uninterrupted two (2) week block of time
4

with the minor children. However, in order to exercise this uninterrupted parenting time with the
children, that party must notify the Special Master in writing no later than May 15lh each and
every year.
8.

In accordance with UCA § 78-45-7.16, each parent is to share equally the

responsibility for child care expenses incurred for work related and/or education required to keep
the Respondent's nursing degree on behalf of the minor children:
a.

If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent is to begin paying

his/her share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care
expense, but if they child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making
monthly payments of that expense while it is not being incurred without obtaining a modification
of the child support order.
b.

A parent who incurs child care expenses shall provide written verification

of the costs and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a
provider and thereafter upon the request of the other parent.
c.

The parent shall notify the other parent if any change of child care provider

or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change. The
parent incurring child care expenses shall be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or
to recover from the other parties share of the expenses if the parent incurring the expenses fails to
notify the other parent within said 30 days.
9.

However, each party is ordered to provide first option to their co-parent to provide
5

any day care needs for the children. This rule applies to all situations in which either parent needs
to leave the children for more than one and a half (1 !4 ) hours.
10.

It is reasonable and proper that both parties are required to maintain in effect a

policy of dental, health, and accident insurance at all times that such may be available through
their respective employers at a reasonable cost with the minor children named beneficiaries
thereunder. Further, each party is ordered to pay one-half (!4) of any premiums, deductible
amounts, co-payments, and one-half ( Vi ) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses
(including, but not limited to, accidents, surgery, orthodontics, ophthalmology, optometry
[including eyeglasses], cavities/fillings, psycho logical and or psychiatric care, hospitalization,
broken limbs, physical therapy, continuing illnesses, allergies, etc.) for said minor children.
11.

A parent who incurs medical expenses is to provide written verification of the cost

and payment of the expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
12.

Each party is ordered to reimburse the other party within 30 days for his or her

share of any medical or dental expense that has been paid by the other party that are not covered
by health insurance for the children.
13.

The custodial parent is ordered to provide a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each

creditor providing medical or dental services for the minor children. Pursuant to UCA § 15-4-6.7
(1953), each creditor is to be notified by the custodial parent that the creditor is prohibited from
making claim for unpaid medical expenses against a parent who has paid in full that share of the
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. Each
6

creditor receiving a copy of the Decree oi i^ , ucc is to be notified that the creditor is prohibited
froi n making a negative credit i eport or report of debtor's reravmi -• nractuvs ' >r c^\V !; * •. •
regarding a parent who has paid in full that share of the medical and dental expenses required to

\11 money in the children's accounts are to be used for their purposes. Whichever
party controls the account, they must give the other party notice oi the use of tl lose funds.
ij.

fhose funds and accounts described by Mr. Sheffield and the $32,000 accounts

receivable, that may or inay not be recoverable, are inheritance of Mrs. Resendes and Mr.
Rrsmdr
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simply inheritance.
rhe parties have accumulated two (2) retirement accounts during their marriage,
the 40 IK and the 457 accounts. Mr. Resendes is to prepare and pay for the preparation of the two
(2) QDRO's splitting the two (2) accounts 50/50 as of the date of the divorce. Any costs,
Jin iiiiii ill ilium in Mi iiii I n n |miirjii.in i l l III

50 f50.

he Respondent is awarded the family home, along with its debt The undisputed
\ Ii le • i-i i ii tioi i le is $ 165. 000, tl i z debt $ ) 2,339, leavii ig an equity amount . iv2,oo i. .-i...h
Miilv will be split 50/50. Mr. Resendes' equity will not garner any interest, but is to be paid
ponthefirstof the following events: if the home is sold; if Mrs. Resendes moves from the
nhabitates, remarries; in whenlln

iiiipi .1 i hi I d t u r n s 1 8

.»• ; -

allowed to refinance the home to reduce the interest rate of 7.75%. This is a one time event that
7

will not trigger the equity payment and the refinance is limited to only the existing debt.
18.

The family duplex is awarded to Mr. Resendes along with its debt. The

undisputed value is $120,000. with a debt of $101,025, leaving a net equity o IS 18,975, which
will be split 50/50 between the parties. Mrs. Resendes' equity will be paid upon the first of the
following events: if it is sold; if Petitioner moves from his side he is living on; remarries,
cohabitates; or, when the youngest child turns 18 years of age. No interest will accrue on Mrs.
Resendes' equity. The Court will allow Mr. Resendes to refinance the existing debt to get it
down to a reasonable interest rate from the 9% he is paying now. This is a one time event that
will not trigger the equity payment to Mrs. Resendes, but the refinance is limited to only the
existing debt. If Mr. Resendes refinances more than the existing debt, then he is obligated to pay
Mrs. Resendes her equity.
19.

The joint Discover Card debt was accumulated during a pre-child support order

period and there is a dispute as to how much Mr. Resendes paid Mrs. Resendes during that
period. The Court finds in September the parties agreed the child support would be $1,700 per
month, which even taking Mr. Resendes' view on how much he paid, he had not been paying
Mrs. Resendes $1,700 per month. Consequently, the Court is assigning this debt to Mr.
Resendes. The debt was for items purchased for family necessities and needs, they were not
splurges. The Court is also assigning Mr. Resendes the Net Bank account money that appears he
has raided to the tune of at least $100, but whatever he has taken, he does not need to pay it back,
but he can use the remaining funds to help pay the joint Discover Card debt.
8

20.

•

• '•-

. agreed to a personal property division that the Court approves

based upon the stipulation of the parties, as modified and as per the exhibits offered. Each of the
parties are awarded those items of personal property.
21.

*'

*

ihtnb •

Caravan is ^ akk'd a! $4,000 and is awarded to Mr. Resendes.
22.

\

_-..

. Kc-.ci.ues. It appears that a -•! *>• ^U:if

w a s going on with that account with the transfers and changes to the account and it appears to the
Court that there is approximately $ 1,950 in the account at the present time.
23.

I he Court has consciously awarded more I it ah i = : i the • i it l a tial pi opei it) z , : : : i in its

to Mr. Resendes because the Court is going to order that Mr. Resendes pay the custody

have T H E ability to pay anything towards these two (2) debts. Mrs. Resendes does not even have
the ability to make it on the money she is now earning and consequently, the Court is ordering
Mr. Resendes to pay these debts.
24.

The Court finds that Mr. Resendes has been investing in what has been identified

1 111 I ic'ili ( ill d 1i In I"".! I

Iii \) A i. MM ill ll

! I llii i, In luit ,11 it/" ."st'paiatiini a n d s i n c e t h e

separation, taking either a $100 or $125 per month and investing it into this account. It appears
ili i HI

i" is approximately

U0 in the account at this time. It appears to the Court that given

the financial situation of these parties, Mr. Resendes' investing is a splurpe, it's somrfhinp ili.it
'hese parties cannot afford. The Court specifically finds these funds to be a marital asset and it
9

should be split 50/50.
25.

Mrs. Resendes has not got the ability to pay for her attorney's fees. However, she

should pay a portion of her fees. She has had to go out and borrow funds from her family to pay
her fees while Mr. Resendes has been out accumulating a $5,300 interest in his Investment Club
Partnership. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Resendes has a greater ability to pay fees
than Mrs. Resendes and that he should be ordered to pay $2,650 for her attorney's fees. Whether
Mr. Resendes wants to cash in his share of the $5,300 investment club funds, he should be
allowed to do so. Mr. Resendes has substantial attorney's fees, but the Court is of the opinion
that the money Mr. Resendes used to invest should have gone to his attorney's fees or for the
support of the family, it simply was a splurge. Mr. Resendes shall have 120 days from today's
date to pay those fees. At the expiration of the 120 days, Mrs. Resendes should be awarded
judgment in the sum of the $2,650 which shall garner interest at the statutory rate until paid in
full.
26.

Mr. Resendes clearly has the greater ability to earn income and the Court is

awarding three (3). children to him for tax dependencies; the first, third, and fifth child. The
Respondent is awarded two (2) of the children as tax dependencies; the second and fourth child.
Either party can purchase the exemptions from the other party so long as the party is held
harmless from the purchase. For the year 2003, this split does apply and the parties can file
jointly or separately. If the parties see that they can save money by filing jointly for 2003 and
they agree on it, then they are allowed to do so because they were still married in 2003. The
10

Court is not ordering them to do so, i;^; *.. *. ;. advantageous to them to
;

:;!L JW;..U\

*^u tney noth

:\- *. :o so. then they Court will allow it. ilowever, Mr. Resendes is totally responsible and

- .; hold Mrs. Resendes harmless from, any advance received for the children in 2003.

income has increased annually by small amounts. Therefore, the Court is finding that has 2003
income was $6 7, 46 7 from 1 lis fi ill time employment or : :\o

pc, .-..onin.

-.i.. Kcsei ides,

it's a whole lot tougher. Even though the parties agreed that Mrs. Resendes should stay at home
to raise the children, that situation is no longer going to work. Mrs Resendes has skills as a
liussaiji lln i 1(11' I tnir i'« lni III lllliii in .ippiMi• In

IIH" lilllr
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Resendes however does have skills as a nurse and it appears there is some need for these skills in
this area. Mrs. Resendes has never worked i i lore than part-tin :ie fc i at least tl le last ten (10) years
of this marriage. She still has a pre-age school child for which she should be able to provide care.
Consequently, the Court is not going to order Mrs. Resendes to work full-time, but she can work

some time ago. Minimum wage is $890 a month and she is clearly qualified to do in

than

minimum wage type of \ - • : i 1 : I • sstii i 101 p is till mt i stai ting wage foi a i uirse is $16 60 pei h y nr.
The Court finds that is would be reasonable for Mrs. Resendes to work 72 hours per month at
nursing. She could work six (6) 12 hour shifts or nine (9) 8 hour shifts, which would generate
00 to Mrs. Resendes as income which is
essentially a half-time nurse's income. This is three (3) times her historical income, but given her
u

abilities, training, and the local job market, the Court finds that this part-time income of $1,200
to Mrs. Resendes is reasonable.
28.

For child support puposes, the Court has found that Mr. Resndes earns $5,622 per

month and imputes $1,200 to Mrs. Resendes, making Mr. Resendes' child support obligation to
be $1, 638 per month which will begin April 1. 2003. Universal IncomeWithholding does apply
pursuant to UCA §62A-11-501 (1953 as amended). All payments are to be made through the
Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84145-0011. This income
withholding procedure applies to existing and future payors.
<V

29.

For alimony purposes, the court finds that Mr. Resendes earns $ 5, 622 per month

O

^

and takes in $650 for rents, for total monthly income of $6,272. For alimony purposes, the Court

_

has imputed $1,200 per month to Mrs. Resendes, plus a $100 per month in inheritance, for a total

^

of $1,300 per month.

7
*

30.

For alimony, the Court needs to look at expenses. Mrs. Resendes has her monthly

expenses illustrated on Exhibit 1. These expenses appear to be reasonable and necessary except
for school lunches, that it appears she is not paying, so the Court finds her monthly needs and
expenses to be $3,752. Mr. Resendes' monthly expenses were given orally to the Court and they
are as follows: $1,200 per month for mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the duplex; $125 for
telephone; electricity $100; car insurance $50; gas for car $100; clothes $50; food $250; drill
team $17 per month; medicals $20; house maintenance $50; gifts $25; yard maintenance and
dues $50; entertainment $20; hair $15; car maintenance $20; and tithing $292, for a total of
12

$H_
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i. u i because

it has anything against i t , but because it is a voluntary contribution. Howevei, I'm including it in
both of them because they both claimed it in this case.
31.

V

•(

-•

e

employment as they relate to his monthly expenses. In 2003, Mr. Resendes earned $67,467 and
hu

. / ycx. ..::ngu. i

ir

.. wever,

Exhibit 23 is a pay-stub for December 15-28 of 2002, which shows he only took out 8% for taxes
at a time when they had been separated for six (6) months. Mr Resendes' Exhibit No 21
illustrates that if he were awarded three (3) of the child tax exemptions, he • sfi ttes his effec ti i e • 1, ; t: ;:
rate would be 8%. The i*-\-\' finds that for the 2003 tax year, he took out 12.5% for taxes, which
h tc : ' i i- : •! • .1 • :1 it s 1 i :

H sen 8*5 i Coi ise< p ici ill;; , till :ic: • C ; i i It fii ids tlrat8' :! o c 1 1 lis income is

needed for monthly tax expense in the sum of $502.1 find that his net after tax income for
alimony purposes is So.,//u
32.

r

<aonth.

To calculate the alimony in this case, the Court finds Mrs R< -. n,l

imputed income, $100 for inheritance, and $1,638 for child support, for a total of $2,938.

need o f $814 per month. Mr. Resendes has a total net income of $5,770, less $ 1,638 for child
suppoi I, less I lis reasonable m 0 n t h l y needs ut $J,J89 leaves his ability to pay alimony in the sum
of $1,743, which substantially exceeds Mrs. Resendes; necessary and reasonable alimony need of
$814. The Court specifically finds that Mr. Resends has the income and assets to pay the debts I

have awarded him above, plus a portion of Mrs. Resendes attorney's fees, the custody evaluator.
and the appraisals because the Court is not going to take anything above, Mrs. Resendes" alimony
need of $814 per month. The Court specifically finds he has the ability to pay the debts awarded
to him, his monthly expenses, and alimony of $814 per month and the Court awards Mrs.
Resendes the same. The Court awards Mrs. Resendes said alimony for the length of the marriage
(July 2, 1986 to July 9, 2004), or until the Respondent remarries, cohabitates, or dies, whichever
occurs first.
33.

Consequently, the Court is awarding Mrs. Resendes $1,638 per month in child

support and $814 per month in alimony, for a total of $2,452 per month, which should begin
April 1,2004.
34.

The parties should exchange the personal property awarded to them by April 30,

2004. Mr. Resendes should bring a law enforcement officer if he goes to Mrs. Resendes'
residence to retrieve his property.
35.

Mrs. Resendes is to look for the original insurance policies and if she has them,

she should deliver them to Mr. Resendes by April 30, 2004. However, if Mrs. Resendes can
transfer the policy she has been paying on into her name, she should be allowed to do so.
36.

Pursuant to the parties* stipulation, both parties are ordered to each carry

$100,000.00 of life insurance on their lives, while the children are minors, and designate the
children as the beneficiaries of these policies.
37.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are
14

r e q u i r e d to i m p l e m e n t t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e D e c r e e of D i v o r c e e n t e r e d by t h e Court.,
38.

S h o u l d either p a r t y fail to a b i d e by t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f a D e c r e e of Di vorcv issued

h e r e i n , that p a r t y will b e l i a b l e for i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e other, including a t t o r n e y ' s fees a n d
(
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31)

Both parties have completed the divorce education course for parents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

I his Court has jurisdiction over the parties in the above-entitled matte-

parties are entitled to a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.
upon entry by the Court herein, retroactive to the date of July 8, 2004.
3.

1 lit' 1 "'oitit concludes that all other issues of dispute 1 lave been resolved by the

Court pursuant to the above Findings of Fact.
DATED and signed this

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DOUGLAS L. NEELEY
Attorney for Respondent
15

Addendum 2

L0R1E D. FOWLKE, 6875
PAUL WALDRON 7660
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C
2696 No. University Ave., Ste. 220
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-5600
Attorneys for Petitioner
_
IN 1 HE SIX I H J ! JDICIAL DIS I RIC I COl JR I IN A ND FOR
SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTA11

AMENDED DECRE*
DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.
TAMARA JOY RESENDES,

Case No.
Judge:

024600138
Paul Lyman-

Respondent.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 2nd dm

'• »04, llm I1< HIII >i .il ill

Judge Paul D. Lyman presiding. The Respondent appeared in person and was represented by her
attorney, I)ouj.»las I,

NIV.ICY

Tin; [VlihmitT apptrnrecl in pci'Mtu and was represented by his

attorney, Lorie D. Fowlke. The Court, having received and accepted the parties' partial
'liiiiil.'iiiiiii In.i iiijj, it'tt

IUII

ilii

'AVIUM

testimony of witnesses and other evidence, having heard

argument of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and entered its Findings
< jci..

* lclusions of Law, now, therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract heretofor existing by and

between the Petitioner and Respondent be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the parties are
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce one from the other, said Decree to become absolute and
final upon entry by the Court herein, and effective as of July 8, 2004.
2.

There have been five (5) children born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Melissa

Joy, born January 13, 1988; Elysha Briana, born May 4, 1990; Lauren Taylor, born September
13, 1994; Aubriana Tess, born April 1, 1997; and Annaliese Conine, born July 14, 1999.
3.
*"V

The Court adopts and incorporates the orders regarding custody and visitation

from the Order Pursuant To Stipulation (Hearing Date: September 15, 2003) wherein the parties

O

5^

are awarded the joint legal custody of the partie's minor children. The Respondent is designated
as the primary residential parent for the children in regards to parenting time.

JA

i

4.

The Petitioner is entitled to parenting time pursuant to the statutory guidelines,

which includes every other weekend, mid-week visits and alternating holidays.
a.

Special Days. The parties' stipulated and the Court orders up to eight (8) potential

additional "special visitation" or "special event" days. These additional days shall be at the direction
of the Special Master.
b.

Lunch Dates with Dad. Petitioner is awarded alternating lunch with one (1) of the

children at school, so long as it does not interfere with the school curriculum. If Petitioner plans to
remove that child from the school during the lunch hour for a special lunch, he should notify the
Respondent prior to doing so.
c.

Telephone Contact with Children. The non-custodial parent shall be entitled to

i

5-

with the minor children. During the school year and Respondent' s one-

half summer blocks, Petitioner shall be entitled to call the children a coupir

u

-> i *. i

However, all phone calls shall" be prior to 9:00 p m. and should be of a reasonable duration.
Likewise, R esn* i-Jr-r

J *,-:

:

I |

[,,!,), „ ,l,,,iiijr

those times that the children are with Petitioner for his one-half summer blocks. The children shall
t""" * ••''

i

in ' nil" i |uini

HI any nine as they desire and neither party shall prohibit or limit the

children from doing so. In addition, if Petitioner so desires, he may purchase a cell phone loi i i r
exclusive use of the children so that they may contact him whenever or wherever they may be.
d.

Events of Children. Eachpurtv ^hall hv nnlrrt"! 1li. rulifv <"l « ""in ;v,nvnl in

advance of any and all events in the lives of their children so that both parents may participate
a
e

-

s

^ *»

Notice to Move. If either party intends to move from Sevier Couinty, that parent
her parent sixty (60) days advance written notice.

£

Communication. All communication between th( ; | >arties sh« ill be < ia • ,i : - , .il.

However, this rule shall not apply to urgent or emergency situations. During these types of
situations, telephone contact i inprnprififr mil i i yu il,
g

Religious Ordinances. Petitioner has the first right to perform all LDS religious
.^.

h

.

ucuiied wor thy by his ecclesiastical leaders to

Encourage Visitation. The court instructs the parties to be aware that parenting

time with the visiting parent is not the children's choice nor shoni I "J|- "I"
choice as to whether or not they can or should be allowed to exercise parenting time. 1 lie
children for purposes of

parenting time with the Petitioner. Both the Petitioner and the Respondent are admonished that
the children should be ready to be delivered, as well as returned at the designated times, pursuant
'lo^tutac.^DtJui piffues ^sn^n respect arid accommodate the needs of their daughter, Melissa, as it
relates to her extra-curricular activities and schedule. However, Melissa's schedule does not
minimize her need to have regular and scheduled parenting time with her father. Reasonable and
minor alternations to parenting time can be made with the assistance of the Special master.
These additional days shall be at the direction of the Special Master. Both parties are to
respect and accommodate the needs of their daughter, Melissa, as it relates to her extra curricular
activities and schedule. However, Melissa's schedule does not minimize her need to have regular
and scheduled parenting time with her need to have regular and scheduled parenting time with
her father. Reasonable and minor alterations to parenting time can be made with the assistance of
the Special Master.
5.

Petitioner and Respondent are each awarded one-half of each and every summer

with the minor children, in the following manner.
a.

The parties are entitled to two (2) week blocks with the minor children

which will alternate between them for the duration of the summer. Summer parenting time will
be subject to normal and statutory parenting time by the non-custodial parent (i.e weekend
visitation). However, one (1) week prior to the commencement of school, the children will be
returned to the Respondent in order to prepare for school.
b.

Each party is entitled to one (1) uninterrupted two (2) week block of time

with the minor children. However, in order to exercise this uninterrupted parenting time with the
children, that party must notify the Special Master in writing no later than May 15th each and
every year.

6.

In accordance with UCA § 78-45-7.16, each parent is to share equally the

iiiii;"-fioiiMiliiiiillliil "i II ni mi llliiiilill I HIT r x p i DM 1 1 IIIIIIIII IIIIIIIII i l II ni in m i ! mm II ml
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keep

the Respondent's nursing degree on behalf of the minor children:
a.

If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent is to begin paying

his/her share on a monthly basis immediately i ipon presentation of proof of the child care
expense, but if they child care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making
month'

*• •

i

of the child support order.
b.

A. parei it • i • 1 10 ii iici u s :::l lild cai e e x p e u ^ M;J.

wide written verification

of the costs and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of a
provider and thereafter upon the request of the other parent.
c.

The parent shall notify the other parent if any change of child care provider

or the monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of the change. The
f i i i t i n i t i l l IIIIIIIII' 1 1 II l i n l i l I i I I f r KJK mi t i s k i l l In i l l m i i l iiiiiii mi ni 11" I I mii n i n r i n e i in IIIIIIII IIKIII i l i t e x p e n s e s o r

to recover from the other parties share of the expenses if the parent incurring the expenses fails to
i lotify th i other parent within said 30 days.
7.

However, each party is ordered to provide first option to their co-parent to provide

any day care needs for the children. This rule applies to all situations in which either parent needs
to leave the children for more than one and a half (1 lA ) hours,
8.
t

Both parties are required to maintain in effect a policy of dental, health, and
4ii

employers at a

reasonable cost with the minor children named beneficiaries thereunder. Further, each party is
ordered to pay one-half ( Vi) of any premiums, deductible amounts, co-payments, and one-half (

Vi ) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses (including, but not limited to, accidents,
surgery, orthodontics, ophthalmology, optometry [including eyeglasses], cavities/fillings,
psychological and or psychiatric care, hospitalization, broken limbs, physical therapy, continuing
illnesses, allergies, etc.) for said minor children.
9.

A parent who incurs medical expenses is to provide written verification of the cost

and payment of the expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment.
10.

Each party is ordered to reimburse the other party within 30 days for his or her

share of any medical or dental expense that has been paid by the other party that are not covered
by health insurance for the children.
11.

The custodial parent is ordered to provide a copy of the Decree of Divorce to each

creditor providing medical or dental services for the minor children. Pursuant to UCA § 15-4-6.7
(1953), each creditor is to be notified by the custodial parent that the creditor is prohibited from
making claim for unpaid medical expenses against a parent who has paid in full that share of the
medical and dental expenses required to be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce. Each
creditor receiving a copy of the Decree of Divorce is to be notified that the creditor is prohibited
from making a negative credit report or report of debtor's repayment practices or credit history
regarding a parent who has paid in full that share of the medical and dental expenses required to
be paid by that parent by the Decree of Divorce.
12.

All money in the children's accounts are to be used for their purposes. Whichever

party controls the account, they must give the other party notice of the use of those funds.
13.

Those funds and accounts described by Mr. Sheffield and the $32,000 accounts

receivable, that may or may not be recoverable, are inheritance of Mrs. Resendes and Mr.
Resendes has no right, title or interest in them, at all, or the $100 a month that they generate, it is

simply inheritance.
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the 40IK and the 457 accounts. Mr. Resendes is to prepare and pay for the preparation of the two
(2) QUI ? O's splitting ill I : I1 vo (2) accoui its 513/ 50 as of the date of tl le divorce. Any costs,
incurred, other than for preparation, will be split 50/50.
I le Respondent is awarded the family home, along with its debt The undisputed
value of the home is $165,000, the debt $72.,

TW, I i1 'iiiiiifi"", ,in i qui

< unil I $*>2,(»M , \ hi In

equity will be split 50/50. Mr. Resendes' equity will not garner any interest, u <s t. be paid
I IJ: : J i il :ic fii st of tl ic; foil

its: if tl lehome is sold:; if N !i s. R esendes- •

home, cohabitates, remarries; or, when the youngest child turns 18 years of age,
111 in, i I I n I i cliuaiice the home to reduce the interest rate -

. .

-

Mrs. Resendes is

.sis a one time event that

will not trigger the equity payment and the refinance is limited to only the existing debt.
1

*

The family duplex is awarded to Mr. Resendes along with its debt. The

undisputed vahu is S P O CHMI \

I ;t <IVi* mil tlfll IPS Ilk i m,. • m

| i

IP) 18,075., whu Ii

will be split 50/50 between the parties. Mrs. Resendes' equity will be paid upon the first of the
vinp on; remarries,
cohabitates; or, when the youngest child turns 18 years of age.

No interest will accrue on Mrs.

Resendes' equity. 1 he Court will allow Mr. Resendes to refinance the existing debt to get it
dowii to a reasonable interest rate from the 9% he is paying now. This is a one time eves-- ' t
will not trigger the equity payment to Mrs. Resendes, but the refinance is limited to only the
existing drbf If Mr Resnidrs m liiiimn"*- IIIIIII i n IIIIIILIIIIIIII il l i i >ui 1 i i i j » ill h i illlliii I I I IIIIII in n l i l i j a l l i l I n |i i
Mrs.

Resendes her equity.
17.

1he Petitioner is ordered to assume and pay the joint Discover Card debt. The

Court is also assigning Mr. Resendes the Net Bank account money from which he can use the
remaining funds to help pay the joint Discover Card debt.
18.

The parties have agreed to a personal property division that the Court approves

based upon the stipulation of the parties, as modified and as per the exhibits offered. Each of the
parties are awarded those items of personal property.
19.

The Suburban has a value of $5,090 and is awarded to Mrs. Resendes. The

Caravan is valued at $4,000 and is awarded to Mr. Resendes.
20.

The AmeriTrade Account is awarded to Mr. Resendes, in which there is

approximately $1,950 in the account at the present time.
21.

Mr. Resendes is ordered to pay the custody evaluation and the appraisal costs.

22.

The Investment Club Partnership Account with approximately $5,300 in the

account at this time is to be split 50/50.
23.

Mr. Resendes is ordered to pay $2,650 for a portion of Mrs. Resendes' attorney's

fees. Whether Mr. Resendes wants to cash in his share of the $5, 300 investment club funds, he is
allowed to do so. Mr Resendes will have 120 days from today's date to pay those fees. If the fees
are not paid at the expiration of the 120 days, Mrs. Resendes is awarded judgment in the sum of
the $2,650 which shall garner interest at the statutory rate until paid in full.
24.

Mr. Resendes is awarded three (3) children to him for tax dependencies; the first,

third, and fifth child. The Respondent is awarded two (2) of the children as tax dependencies;
the second and fourth child. Either party can purchase the exemptions from the other party so
long as the party is held harmless from the purchase. For the year 2003, this split does apply and
the parties can file jointly or separately. If the parties see that they can save money by filing
jointly for 2003 and they agree on it, then they are allowed to do so because they were still

I

Mill nI 1 In, ( ouit JS not ordering them to do so, but if it is advantageous to them to file

jointly and they both agree to do so, then they Court will allow it I Inwrvn I Ii U < snides is
totally responsible and will hold Mrs. Resendes harmless from, any advance received for the
children in 2003.
25

For child support puposes, the Court has found that Mr. Resndes earns $5,622 per

inn it : ntl i an i :1 in i ipi ite s $1 ,200 t : I In s Resendes, making Mr. Resendes' child support obligation to
be $1, 638 per month which will begin April 1, 2003. Universal Income Withholding, dors ipplv
pursuant lo Ul"'A fc02A I 1 -Ml I (1953 as amended). All payments are to be made through the
Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 450!

' V - ' - « rjiy l i|,-.l "'fM' n

withholding procedure applies to existing and future payors.
sendes e a m s ^() ^

including $650

in rental income) and imputes $1200 plus $100 a month inheritance to Mrs. Resendes. Mrs.
Uf% ,, ,

"» " «

* • ii. h 11 !"li"l I 1 p e r m o n t h i n a l i m o n y , f, w i t h . . . i > •• c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r a total o f $ 2 , 4 5 2

H;; nigral. > which will begin April 1, 2004. Alimony is awarded for the len i

uiin^r

..<i U-. July 8, 2004) or until Respondent remarries, cohabitates or dies, which ever
occurs first.
27

The parties are ordered to exchange the personal property awarded to them by

'i 111 ni I i l l H U M f Hi I I" r s i m i l l • i il hung ci 1.1\\ ujlmccmenl oilKU JI he goes to Mrs. Resendes'
residence to retrieve his property.
28.

IVli Resendes is to look for the original insurance policies and if she has them,

she is ordered to deliver them to Mr. Resendes by April 30, 2004 Hi u<m/pr if MIN I' t•-•• mli • vm
transfer the policy she has been paying on into her name, she is allowed to do so.
29.

Pursi lantto 11

|

"

li|.lIhj '

(

lit! .in" «u Ii i»'d lo caih carry

$100,000.00 of life insurance on their lives, while the children are minors, and designate the
children as the beneficiaries of these policies.
30.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents as are

required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court.
31.

Should either party fail to abide by the provisions of a Decree of Divorce issued

herein, that party will be liable for indemnification of the other, including attorney's fees and
Court costs incurred in the enforcement of the Decree of Divorce.
DATED this [ ( day of Ja»w*y*2005t

JUDGE7&UL D.
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

DOUGLAS L. NEELEY
Attorney for Respondent

